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Distribution Agreements Price

Generally speaking, U.S. antitrust laws such as Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in the absence of monopoly power, deal with concerted actions and not unilateral behavior. Therefore, if the supplier makes the sale itself, such as in its own points of sale, in a controlled subsidiary or in most jurisdictions, through a real agent, pricing is unilateral and usually not problematic. However, an agreement between independent entities, in which the supplier regulates the resale prices of a trader, franchisee or licensee, raises anti-cartel concerns. Even in the case of a supposedly unilateral policy, for example. B of an announced supplier policy, to treat only retailers who respect the resale price offered by the manufacturer (EIA), it is necessary to ensure the strict application of the Directive. A lax application can be interpreted as a constraint on a resale price-fixing contract and not as a mere definition of a unilateral policy (see question 15). Import and Distribution of Face Plates and Respirators During the COVID-19 Pandemic* Introduction This article discusses the importation and distribution of respiratory masks and other masks to meet the considerable challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. healthcare sector. As reported in the news (…) Note that an agreement between competitors at the same level of distribution, which is not to trade with certain customers or to restrict with whom customers are allowed to act, is treated as a horizontal restriction, in itself illegal, and not as a vertical restriction subject to the rule of reason.

Therefore, if a restriction on the handling of certain customers emanates from a group of competing traders, a supplier may run the risk of being considered an illegal participant in that horizontal conspiracy if the same restriction imposed by the supplier could be lawful. Appropriate price, territory and customer restrictions for merchants are legal. The requirements imposed by manufacturers can benefit consumers by increasing competition between different brands (inter-fire competition), while competition between distributors of the same brand (intra-brand competition) is reduced. For example, an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor on fixed maximum price limits (or “caps”) prevents distributors from calculating a non-competitive price. Or an agreement to set minimum prices (or “ground prices”) or to limit areas can encourage distributors to offer a level of service that the manufacturer wants to offer to consumers when purchasing the product. These benefits must be weighed against the reduction of competition through restrictions. A: These provisions, called “most-favoured-nation clauses,” are quite common. Generally speaking, most of the agreement promises that one party treats the other party at least as well as others.

In most cases, the highest remuneration is a legitimate way to reduce risk. However, in certain circumstances, NMFs may inappropriately limit the offer of targeted discounts and create a de facto sectoral price. The FTC challenged a most-favoured-nation clause used by a pharmacy network in individual contracts with its member pharmacies, which prevented it from providing discounts on reimbursement rates. .

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