1 Since the publication of the results of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the BRITISH government, which has begun negotiations with the EU to leave the European Union, the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland has proved to be the main point of contention against London and the EU negotiating teams. More than three years after the referendum, and although Theresa May`s government has promised to find solutions to keep the Irish border as transparent and invisible as it was before Brexit, the backstop, contained in the 2018 draft between London and Michel Barnier`s team, is just a trick to push back the Irish border problem. It has not provided a solution because it lacks political support.1 The purpose of this document is to analyze the reasons that may be responsible for such a complex and complex situation. The agreement contains a complex set of provisions in a number of areas, including: www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/moderates-northern-ireland-good-friday-agreement/587764/. In 2004, negotiations were held between the two governments, the DUP, and Sinn Féin, for an agreement to restore the institutions. The talks failed, but a document published by governments detailing the changes to the Belfast agreement was known as the “comprehensive agreement.” However, on 26 September 2005, it was announced that the Provisional Republican Army of Ireland had completely closed its arsenal of weapons and had “taken it out of service”. Nevertheless, many trade unionists, especially the DUP, remained skeptical. Among the loyalist paramilitaries, only the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) had decommissioned all weapons.  Further negotiations took place in October 2006 and resulted in the St Andrews Agreement. 8 Hayward, K., All simple solutions for the Irish border after Brexit do not recognise complex realities, 21 September 2018, ukandeu.ac.uk/all-simple-solutions-to-the-post-brexit-irish-border-fail-to-acknowledge-complex-realities/. The US could accept any Brexit deal from Britain and the EU, with the exception of any deal.
In an ideal world, the U.S. government would have facilitated dialogue between the parties, as it has in the past; It would, for example, have helped to negotiate an acceptable variant of a backstop since then in Northern Ireland or to support efforts to restore the de decentralised government. At this point, the administration`s interventions that defend a party to their advantage are considered troublesome rather than useful. But at least it should refrain from advocating a Brexit without a disastrous deal that the BRITISH government`s contingency plans 33 show would have far-reaching negative consequences, including for the long-standing US interest in a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland.